







Abstract. We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction
to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the
goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.
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Suppose that you want to assign a good to one of two agents in a Pareto efficient way. Agent i
values the good at vi , so Pareto efficiency dictates that the good should go to the agent <BR> with
the highest value. Vickrey (1961) suggests asking the agents to bid on the good and awarding the
good to the highest bidder at the second highest price.
This mechanism has the following desirable property. It is a dominant strategy for each agent
to truthfully reveal his true value; hence if each agent plays a dominant strategy the outcome will
be Pareto efficient.
To see this, suppose that agent i bids bi. The expected payoff to agent 1 is
Prob[b1 > b2][v1   b2]:
If v1   b2 > 0, then agent 1 can make the probability of winning 1 by reporting b1 = v1. On
the other hand if v1 < b2 agent 1 can make the probability of winning 0 by reporting b1 = v1.
If v1 = b2 any bid is optimal. Hence, reporting the truth is always an optimal <BR> strategy, no
matter what the other party reports.
The same argument works if there are n agents: award the good to the agent with the highest
bid and charge him the second highest price. If there are k units of the good to sell, and each agent
wants only a single unit, one can award the goods to the k highest bidders at the kth highest price.
But what happens if agents want more than one unit of the good? What if there are externalities
among the agents so that one agent cares about whether one of the other agents gets the good?
In this note we generalize the Vickrey auction to these situations. We show that the Vickrey
auction is closely related to the Clarke-Groves mechanism (Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)), a fact
that has been widely observed. However, perhaps it has not been sufficiently appreciated just how
general the Vickrey auction is.
The closest analysis to this one is Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986). See also Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) for a nice treatment of incentive compatibility. However, it appears that these
authors treat only the case where each agent wants a single unit of the good and there are no
externalities.
1. Preliminaries
Suppose that there are a = 1; : : : ; A agents. Agent a can take some action xa (e.g., choose a
bundle of goods). The set of actions taken by all the agents is x = (x1; : : : ; xA). The set of
all actions, except for xa, is denoted by x a. A feasible set of actions satisfies the condition
F (x) = F (xa; x a) = 0.
Agent a’s utility function has the quasilinear form
ua(x) +ma;
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where ma is the amount of “money” held by agent a. The initial endowment of money held by
agent a is ma. Note that an agent’s utility depends on the whole set of actions taken; thus there can
be arbitrary patterns of externalities among the agents.













If we assume that the utility functions are strictly concave there will be a unique value of x








2. Incentive Compatible Implementation
Consider the following Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).
1. Each agent a reports a utility function ra().






F (x) = 0







which is the total valuation of all agents other than a according to their reported utility
functions.






where Ga(r a) is an arbitrary function of the other agents’ reported utilities. We claim that it is a
dominant strategy for each agent to report his or her true utility function. To see this, note first that
a necessary condition for the maximization in item (2) is that x maximizes ra(x) +W a(xa).
Agent a’s true payoff is given in item (3). It follows that agent a will maximize his payoff by
setting ra() = ua(). The set of actions taken will then be the actions that maximize the sum of
the true utility functions.
There is no guarantee that the government’s budget will balance; in fact, in general it will not.









F (0; x a) = 0:
This is the “second-price” analogue to the original Vickrey auction. Each agent is charged the total
social surplus that would be possible if that agent did not participate in the auction at all. The
result, then, is that the net payoff received by agent a is the net increment in total surplus that his
participation creates.
If the only externalities are negative, not positive, then the auction raises non-negative revenue.
With negative externalities, Gi > W i, for all agents i, because the other agents are better off with
a not participating.1 That means that each agent pays a non-negative amount for her allocation.
If there are costs of production, these can be simply recovered by adding them to Ga without
changing the problem, since the production costs do not depend on the bid values.
As a simple example, consider the original Vickrey problem: one unit of one good, winner-
takes-all; assume there are only two bidders, a and b. In that case, the person with the highest
reported utility gets ua + [0   ub]. ub is the surplus that the second bidder would get if a did not
participate, because b would then get the good. This is the standard Vickrey rule: bidder a gets
the good, pays bidder b’s bid (which truthfully revealed b’s valuation), and keeps the net, ua   ub.
The loser, of course, gets 0 + [ua   ua] = 0.
3. Examples
For these examples, we implement the GVA using the specific Ga(r a) function suggested above.
GVA with 0-1 good
Suppose that there are two agents and a single good so that xa is zero or one. The utility of agent a




Let b1 = r1(f1; 0g), that is, the value from getting the good as reported by agent 1. Then, we can
evaluate G2 and W 2 to get
v2x2   [b1   b1(1  x2)] = [v2   b1]x2:
If b2 > b1 the auctioneer will set x2 = 1 and if b2 < b1 the auctioneer will set x2 = 0. Truthfully
setting b2 = v2 ensures that agent 2 achieves the optimal utility in either case.
1 Though not usually phrased this way, the second price in the traditional Vickrey auction is actually the correct congestion
price: when a gets the good, that causes congestion and crowds out b’s consumption. The social cost of that congestion is
the utility foregone by b.
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GVA with multiple units
Suppose that there are 3 units of the good to be sold. Agent 1 is willing to pay (10,8,6) for 1,2 or 3
units of the good; agent 2’s willingness to pay is (9,7,5). Pareto efficiency requires that the 2 units
of the good go to agent 1, and that 1 unit goes to agent 2. The competitive equilibrium involves a
price p where 8  p > 7.
The GVA assigns the Pareto efficient amounts to the agents. Agent 1 pays 12 = 7 + 5. This
is how much welfare would be generated by the two goods that agent 1 holds if agent 1 were not
present. Similarly, agent 2 pays 6 for his one unit of the good. Hence each agent ischarged the
opportunity cost of his holdings.
GVA with buyer and seller
There are two agents who value a good at v1 and v2. Agent 2 has an initial endowment of 1 unit of
the good; agent 1 has 0 units of the good. Let x denote how much of the good he transfers to agent
1. Under the dominant strategy of truthful revelation, the agents’ payoffs are:
v1x+ v2(1  x)  v2 = (v1   v2)x
v2(1  x) + v1x  v1 = (v1   v2)x+ (v2   v1):
It is easy to verify that if v1 > v2, agent 1 receives the good and has utility v1   v2. If v2 > v1,
agent 2 receives the good and gets utility v2   v1. In both cases the agent that doesn’t have the
good receives 0 utility.
Essentially each person states a value; the person who states the highest value gets the good at
the price stated by the other person. The person who states the lower value gets 0.
GVA with congestion externalities
Suppose that there are 2 agents and agent a has a concave differentiable utility function ua(x) =
Ua(xa)  Ca(xb). Suppose further that agent a satiates at xa. The dominant strategy equilibrium
is then (xa; xb) but Pareto efficiency would require a choice (xa; x

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a) for a = 1; 2:
Under the GVA agent a would report Ra()   Da(). The auctioneer would choose x to
maximize the sum of the reported utilities:
Ra(xa) Da(xb) +Rb(xb) Db(xa):
The auctioneer then calculates W a(x) = Rb(xb ) Db(x

















so clearly a wants to report
Ra() Da()  Ua() Ca():
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Now, if we let the arbitrary term Ga(r a) = maxx
P
b6=a rb(0; x a), which in this case is




Indeed, a’s payoff is reduced below his direct utility by precisely the incremental surplus that b
loses as a result of the congestion externality imposed by a’s participation. Thus, each agent is
charged for the congestion cost that it imposes on the other agent.
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